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The “Protection of the Competitive Process” Standard
Federal Trade Commission Hearings
November 1, 2018
Tim Wu
Julius Silver Professor of Law
Columbia University
The good faith version1 of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust has been, I believe,
an ambitious and even worthy experiment, but ultimately a project that has failed on its own
terms. Hoping to impart a scientific-like certainty to the antitrust law, it has not succeeded; and
instead run into the limits of a legal system to assess the full range of costs and benefits that
would be necessary to the enterprise. Over the last two decades, we have seen that the
approach has consistently neglected a range of harms important to the health of the economy
— among others dynamic costs, quality effects, and projected prices, let alone potential harms
to labor markets and political considerations. Hence the search for an alternative.
Looking back, the consumer welfare standard can be best understood as well-suited for
measuring the harms of price collusion; but it migrated too far from its natural home. In
particular, it does not perform well as a legal standard when it comes to collusive exclusion,
unilateral exclusion and most of all, merger review. In all of these areas, courts, at best, treat
harm to consumers as implied by harm to competition,2 but at worst allow every case to become
a quixotic, case-by-case search for price effects or lack thereof — the problem of “price fixation.”
The old joke about the economist and the streetlight has become the very soul of the law, which
might be funny if it wasn’t so tragic.
There are those, whom I respect, who believe that the consumer welfare standard is
essentially correct, but simply has been wrongly applied and can be recovered. I respect that
view, but I believe we must deal with what the standard has become, not what it once was or
could be. In theory, the standard can incorporate non-price harms, quality effects, innovation
harms, and so on. But in our times, it is tainted. It has become indelibly associated, in far too
many cases, with the placing of a burden on plaintiff to provide concrete proof of price effects.
That has lead to obvious and undeniable distortions in the law’s enforcement. It is time to retire
the consumer protection standard, and for the law to re-embrace its original goal, “protection of
the competitive process.”
Protection of the Competitive Process
For most conduct cases, I think the antitrust law should return to a standard more
realistic and suited to the legal system — the “protection of the competitive process.”3

The “good faith” consumer welfare standard, by which I mean the earnest and honest effort to tether the law to a welfare standard.
It is safe to say that there is also a “bad faith” version of the standard, whose essential goal is nullification of the law itself.
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As in the Microsoft case, discussed below.

3

The standard goes by many names; I regard the differences as semantic.
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It posits a basic question for law enforcement and judges. Given complained-of conduct, is that
conduct actually part of the competitive process, or is it a sufficient deviation as to be unlawful?
In this view, antitrust law aims to create a body of common-law rules that punish and therefore
deter such disruptions — hence “protecting the competitive process.” What I have said is hardly
radical — in fact, this way be why courts so often continue to depend on a process standard,
even if supposedly focused on consumer welfare.
At the risk of abusing a metaphor, the question is, in many ways, not unlike that faced by
a sports referee in football or soccer. One player tackles another. Is the maneuver actually
part of the competition (a legal tackle), or something that threatens the competitive process
itself? To put in terms used by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade, we must ask
whether it “promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition... The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.”4
As the Court suggested in that case, that question requires a deeply fact-intensive
inquiry, which nowadays means the employment of the most sophisticated economic tools
available. For the government or plaintiff still faces the burden of proving that the conduct
harmed the competitive process. That requires at a minimum, analyzing the context, the history
of the industry, the evident intent of the defendant, and whether what was done falls into a
familiar category of anticompetitive conduct, or whether it is something new. It requires analysis
of market power, to ascertain whether the conduct really did make a difference, whether it really
did pose a threat to the competitive process. And it requires careful analysis of the procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant. This process, done right, yields a body of
rules and standards that, as in our sports metaphor, govern the line between fair and foul, and
thereby protect competition.
But unfortunately the “consumer welfare” approach has tended to take antitrust away
from this key and central inquiry, and weakened the common law development of rules of
standards. For it has evolved into a demand of proof, in every case, not only that the conduct
harmed the competitive process, but but also that it had the effect of harming consumers as
well. That question might matter in some contexts, but to say it always matters, and is indeed
the lodestone of the law, is both unsupportable and can sometimes border on the ridiculous. It
is not unlike asking our referee not only to assess that an illegal maneuver was used in a
football game, but then also prove that it also harmed the fans watching the game. That would
be an absurd undertaking — how would we ever know? Yet here we are.
The “competitive process” approach is much more realistic about the limits of the legal
system. Many areas of the law assumes that courts and judges will struggle to maximize
abstract normative values, like “equality,” “freedom” or “autonomy.”5 In such cases, the law
often turns to doing what it does best — preventing abuse of an underlying process. Hence, to
protect equality, we protect employees from racial discrimination in the employment process.
Freedom of speech is defended by protecting political debate using the First Amendment, and
so on.

4

246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

This is discussed at length in Richard Fallon, Implementing the Constitution (2001) (describing the Supreme Court’s many practical
means of protecting higher-order values).
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It is similarly challenging to protect “welfare” or the“health,” or even the
“competitiveness” of the economy. In practice, as everyone knows, harm to the welfare of
consumers is an abstraction that is usually unmeasurable; indeed, measuring “welfare”
suggests the kind of impossible measurement task that Fredrick Hayek took to be the great flaw
in centrally planned economies. It does better by a proxy — focusing on protection of the
competitive process — assumed to be external to the legal system that can be interfered with
and disrupted by powerful parties.
Microsoft and the Problem of a “Price Trump”
As I’ve said, sometimes, judges simply imply that consumers are harmed by harms to
the competitive process, which means the two standards have collapsed into one. But price
effects, or lack thereof, always threaten to become the trump. That’s the case, even though, in
some of the most important cases prosecuted over the last few decades the proof of harm to
consumer welfare was never mathematically determinate at the time, yet it was clear, in
retrospect, just how much those firms were holding back.
There are, I believe, a great many cases that show the flaws of the today’s consumer
welfare standard. Among the most glaring are the recent American Express case, the AT&T Time Warner merger, the American Airlines predatory pricing case, the approval of the United
and American airlines mergers, the approval of Ticketmaster - Live Nation, the approval of
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp, and Google’s acquisition of Waze. But I
would like to look back at the Microsoft decision a lesson in the potential dangers of consumer
welfare standard, for it is my contention that, under today’s consumer welfare standard, it would
have come out the opposite way.
In the most important Section 2 of the last several decades, Microsoft was accused of
attacking the competitive process in its targeting of Netscape and Java, which it saw as a threat
to its platform monopoly. Yet, in retrospect, there was no clear or decisive evidence of harm to
consumers in the case. Microsoft, after all, was giving Explorer away for free, while Netscape
was originally charging $20. As Douglas Melamed, then a lead attorney at the Department of
Justice, stated in an earlier panel on Microsoft “no one knows what the price effects were of the
conduct we’ve been talking about. We’ve talked about innovation, but no one really knows what
innovation would have taken place but for the wrongful conduct.…”6
There is a real danger that the Microsoft case would today be thrown out based on a
failure to demonstrate clear harm to consumer welfare. Robert Samuelson, among others,
charged at the time that the case should be dismissed for just this reason, and in our times,
there is reason to fear that a court might have done just that.7 Fortunately it did not. Instead,
the D.C. Circuit solved the problem by stating that “to be condemned as exclusionary, a
monopolist's act must have an “anticompetitive effect.” That is, it must harm the
competitive process….” It then implied that harm to the competitive process was also harm to
consumers.8

6

FTC Panel on Microsoft.
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Robert Samuelson, ”But Did Microsoft Actually Hurt Consumers?,” Washington Post op-ed, Nov. 17, 1999.
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“… and thereby harm consumers.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Some might argue that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Microsoft proves that the consumer
welfare standard is flexible enough to yield the right results. But that was twenty years ago, and
I think a charitable interpretation. The standard, today, always presents the risk that a judge will
will the standard as demanding proof of price harms to consumers Every case, even as good a
case as Microsoft, faces the risk dismissal on that basis, and hence of becoming a battle over
whether destruction of competition might provably cost consumers a few bucks down the line.
What is good about a “protection of the competitive process” standard is puts the legal
system — enforcers and courts — in a position to do what they do best: oversee a process. It
makes it clear that they are making the difficult assessment, based on the breath of the
evidence presented, as to whether an illegal and unwarranted attack on the competitive process
has taken place. It focuses attention on the right problem, and eliminates the price trump effect
that the consumer welfare standard threatens.
Structure & Merger Review
What I suggest takes the antitrust laws as I believe they were intended: as a statement
of faith in the virtues of competitive systems, and a quasi-constitutional commitment to
preserving a competitive as opposed to a trustified, or monopolized economy, given the
experience of the late 19th century, and in reaction to the centralized economies of the fascist
and communist world.9 I want to suggest that the standards for merger review, which have
drifted too far from an emphasis on economic structure as a means of protecting the competitive
process.
Returning to our sports metaphors, in leagues like the NFL or sports like boxing there
has long been structural tools for protecting competition, or“competitive parity.” In boxing, for
example, the weight classes are intended to ensure that competition is on the merits — the skill
of the boxers, as opposed to simply the question of who weighs more. In antitrust, the insight is
the same: we assume that there is such a thing as a competitive process, and that that process
is strongly influenced by the structure of the industry: most of all, how many firms are really in
each industry, how large and capable they are, and how well protected they are against
competition as between each other and from outside entrants.
No economist would seriously deny that the number of firms, their market share, and the
barriers to entry maintained singly or jointly determines the very nature of competition in an
industry. And yet somehow — as well documented by Carl Shapiro and Jonathan Baker10 —
merger review has slid further away from recognizing structure and tended to move to a openended analysis of price effects and claimed efficiencies in the consideration of most mergers.
Imagine that a boxing league had a featherweight category for fighters weighing
between 118-124 pounds. To a given fight a 200-pound fighter shows up, accompanied by his
experts, who testify that they have proof that for this particular fight, for a variety of complex
reasons, we cannot prove with certainty that the extra weight will definitively yield an advantage
that will cause consumer harm — i.e., harm to the fans. Unfortunately, merger law has grown to

9

This view is elaborated in Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness (2018).

See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in How the Chicago School Overshot the
Mark 235 (Robert Pitofsky, ed., 2008).
10

4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276896

tolerate and accept these kind of arguments, with well known and well-documented
consequences.
I reiterate the call that in merger review law need return to strong and real structural
presumptions — presumptions that operate, as the Sean Sullivan argues, as a substantive
inference of harm to the competitive process.11 For it cannot be denied that, as Baker and
Shapiro put it “market structure matters, in the following specific sense: in the absence of entry
and merger efficiencies, a merger that leads to a substantial increase in market concentration
will tend to raise price, harm consumers, and reduce economic efficiency. “

What Structural Presumption?: Reuniting Evidence and Economics on the Role of Market Concentration in Horizontal Merger
Analysis, 42 Journal of Corporation Law 403 (2016)
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